Common Carrier Duties in Uber and Lyft Passenger Cases

Bottom line. Uber and Lyft are charter party carriers and, for purposes of their passengers, common carriers. They owe the utmost care and diligence under Civil Code § 2100 — the most demanding duty California tort law imposes — and that duty is nondelegable under Eli v. Murphy (1952) 39 Cal.2d 598. An independent-contractor label cannot defeat it. On April 20, 2026, a federal jury in Charlotte returned a verdict against Uber on exactly this theory in WHB 823 v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (W.D.N.C.).

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Why Uber and Lyft are common carriers

Under Public Utilities Code § 211, a common carrier includes "every person and corporation providing transportation for compensation to or for the public or any portion thereof." A charter party carrier may operate "in common or contract carriage" (Pub. Util. Code § 5360), and the Legislature declared TNCs to be "a new category of charter-party carriers." (Pub. Util. Code § 5440(a).)

The TNC's transportation services are available to any member of the public who downloads its application:

• No membership requirement. Anyone can install the app.
• No screening of passengers. Riders are accepted without vetting.
• Standardized, algorithmically determined fares. The TNC sets the price; the rider takes it.

Federal courts applying California law have recognized that Uber meets the common carrier definition. (Doe v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2016) 184 F.Supp.3d 774, 787; In re Uber Technologies, Inc., Passenger Sexual Assault Litigation (N.D. Cal. 2024) 745 F.Supp.3d 869.) The TNC's services are far more "generally and indifferently available" than the limited availability of a casino shuttle bus or ski lift, both of which California courts have held to be common carriers. (Huang v. The Bicycle Casino, Inc. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 329, 337; Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1499.)

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The duty: utmost care, nondelegable

Common carriers "must use the utmost care and diligence for the safe carriage of their passengers." (Civ. Code § 2100; CACI 902.) That duty is the most demanding California tort law imposes. It is also nondelegable.

"A nondelegable duty is a definite affirmative duty the law imposes on one by reason of his or her relationship with others. One cannot escape this duty by entrusting it to an independent contractor." (Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1036.)

The Supreme Court applied this principle to highway common carriers regulated by the CPUC in Eli v. Murphy (1952) 39 Cal.2d 598, 600, holding that the effectiveness of safety regulations would be impaired if a carrier could escape liability for its independent contractors' negligence. California courts have consistently extended Eli's rule to other regulated motor carriers. (Gamboa v. Conti Trucking, Inc. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 663, 666-668; Serna v. Pettey Leach Trucking, Inc. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1475, 1486.) The principle is codified in CACI 3713.

Because the TNC operates a "new category of charter-party carriers" under the same Public Utilities Code that regulated the carrier in Eli, its duty of utmost care is nondelegable as a matter of law. The federal MDL court overseeing the consolidated Uber passenger sexual assault litigation has held the same. (In re Uber Technologies, Inc., Passenger Sexual Assault Litigation (N.D. Cal. 2024) 745 F.Supp.3d 869.)

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The Mensing bellwether: the common-carrier theory wins on summary judgment and at trial

On April 20, 2026, a federal jury in Charlotte returned a verdict against Uber in the second bellwether trial in MDL No. 3084. The case, WHB 823 v. Uber Technologies, Inc., Case No. 3:25-cv-00737 (W.D.N.C.) (the Mensing case), turned entirely on the common-carrier theory.

Days before trial, Judge Charles R. Breyer granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiff on Uber's common-carrier status under North Carolina law:

"Uber clearly qualifies as a common carrier. The undisputed factual record in this litigation demonstrates that Uber holds itself out to the public as a transportation provider through its ubiquitous advertising as well as the control it exerts over Uber rides and the safety of its passengers."

The court further held that the common-carrier duty is non-delegable: the duty "is breached when an Uber driver assaults a passenger, regardless of whether the driver is properly classified as Uber's employee or an independent contractor under North Carolina law."

That ruling forecloses the central defense argument that Uber's independent-contractor classification of its drivers shields the company from liability for harm caused to passengers. The same reasoning applies under California law, where the common-carrier duty under Civil Code § 2100 is also non-delegable and where the underlying facts about Uber's public-facing transportation operations and control are identical. Bellwether deep dive →

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Scope: passengers only

The common-carrier theory protects TNC passengers. It does not extend to third parties such as pedestrians, cyclists, or drivers of other vehicles who are injured by a TNC driver while no passenger is being carried. The duty of utmost care under Civil Code § 2100 runs to the carrier's passengers, not to the public at large.

For a third-party non-passenger plaintiff, the operative theories are:

• PUC § 5354 imputation (full force regardless of passenger status)
• Secci regulated hirer exception
• Direct negligence under Civ. Code § 1714
• Negligent retention under CACI 426
• Negligent undertaking under CACI 450

Each of these applies in full force regardless of whether the injured party was a passenger. The seven-theory architecture is designed precisely so that no class of victim is left without recourse, but the practitioner must match the theory to the victim.

Period 1, 2, and 3 in third-party cases

The TNC industry has argued that when a driver is operating in Period 1 (logged in but not yet matched) and strikes a pedestrian, no liability attaches because no passenger is involved. The argument fails. Section 5354's "approval or consent" attaches at the moment the algorithm authorizes the driver to operate under the TNC's permit. Period 1 is part of the authorized service. The TNC's Period 1 insurance program confirms it. The same is true of Periods 2 (en route to pickup) and 3 (passenger on board). The injured pedestrian or motorist has the full battery of theories available — only the common-carrier duty is reserved for the contractual rider.

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Practitioner playbook

1. Plead the common-carrier theory whenever the plaintiff is a passenger. Civ. Code § 2100, CACI 902, CACI 3713.
2. Authenticate carrier status through the CPUC permit and Pub. Util. Code §§ 211, 5360, 5440(a). No serious factual dispute.
3. Cite the Mensing summary-judgment ruling and verdict. Persuasive authority on identical facts.
4. Cite the In re Uber MDL 3084 ruling (745 F.Supp.3d 869) on California-law nondelegability.
5. Defeat the "independent contractor" defense with Felmlee and Eli v. Murphy. Nondelegable means nondelegable.
6. For non-passenger plaintiffs, lead with § 5354 and Secci. Do not invest record-building in the common-carrier theory; it will not apply.

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See also

• Hub: The Seven-Theory Framework
• PUC § 5354 — Statutory Imputation Without Employment
• Federal MDL Bellwethers — Dean (Arizona) and Mensing (N.C.)
• Secci Regulated Hirer Exception
• Press: April 30, 2026 Daily Journal Byline + Rutkovitz Award

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